Utolsó frissítés: 2026.06.01. — Szerző: Anti-Propaganda News Blog
One of the most solid pillars of the mainstream narrative of the Middle East conflict is the story of the Six-Day War of 1967. According to the official version, Israel stood as a tiny, defenseless David against the Arab armies that threatened it like Goliath, and only launched a preemptive airstrike on the morning of June 5, 1967, because Egypt threatened an immediate invasion and the destruction of the state.
The American The Intercept However, the classified CIA documents revealed by the CIA, as well as the later testimonies of the Israeli military and political leaders of the time, shed light on: The narrative that sparked the war was a deliberately constructed lie. Israel launched the attack not out of fear of existential destruction, but as part of a long-planned strategy of territorial acquisition and expansion.
1. The casus belli lie: Who shot first?
When the Israeli air force virtually destroyed the Egyptian land fleet on June 5, 1967, Israel communicated to the international community and the UN Security Council that it was merely carrying out a retaliatory strike. The then Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, officially claimed that Egypt had launched an artillery and air attack, and that the Israeli tanks had only crossed the border in response to Egyptian aggression.
This narrative dominated the world press for days. Later, however, Israeli officials themselves were forced to admit that it was a fabrication. Israel had struck the first, devastating blow without any military attack reaching its borders.
2. What the CIA and Mossad both knew: There was no Egyptian threat
According to the hasbara, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's rhetoric and the deployment of troops to the Sinai Peninsula posed an immediate threat of war. However, behind the scenes, intelligence was seeing the real balance of power:
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Pentagon and CIA analyses: According to secret reports placed on the desk of US President Lyndon B. Johnson, the CIA accurately predicted that in the event of war, Israel would win a crushing victory over the Arab armies within days. US intelligence knew that Nasser's forces were on the defensive and had no intention (or capacity) to attack Israel.
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Testimony of the Mossad director: Meir Amit, the head of Mossad at the time, personally assured the American government in Washington that Israel was not in any existential danger and that their military victory could be sealed.
3. Subsequent admissions by Israeli generals
The most shocking evidence came from the Israeli leaders themselves who had led the war. Years later, freed from political pressure, they openly spoke the truth:
„The thesis developed around the context of the 1967 Sinai campaign that the threat of genocide was hanging over our heads… was a complete bluff.” — Matityahu Peled Major General, IDF Logistics Commander in 1967 (quote from Ma'ariv (From the paper, 1972).
„"Nasser didn't want war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been enough to launch an offensive. He knew it, we knew it."” — Yitzhak Rabin then Chief of Staff, later Prime Minister (Le Monde, 1968).
„"Let's not lie to ourselves. We decided to attack them."” — Menachem Begin, then minister of the national unity government, later prime minister (The New York Times, 1982).
4. Why was the myth necessary?
The myth of a „defensive war” and an „inevitable preemptive strike” was essential to Israel’s ability to avoid international sanctions after the war. If the world had viewed the move as aggression, it could have been immediately obliged under international law to withdraw from the occupied territories—Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
However, by selling the conflict as a „miracle-born struggle for survival,” they have entrenched its nearly 60 years of military occupation, which still defines the everyday lives of Palestinians today, the apartheid system and the continuous land seizures by settlers.
Fact-based sources for this article:
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Primary source and analysis:
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Scahill, Jeremy & Hasan, Mehdi (2017): A 50-Year Occupation: Israel's Six-Day War Started with a Lie. The Intercept. (Declassified CIA and State Department documents, 1967).
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Israeli press and political sources:
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Yitzhak Rabin's statement: The World (February 28, 1968).
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Matityahu Peled's statement: Ma'ariv (March 24, 1972).
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Menachem Begin's speech at the Israel National Defense College: The New York Times (August 21, 1982).
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Historical background:
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Segev, Tom (2007): 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. Metropolitan Books. (Based on the encrypted minutes of the ministerial council meetings).
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