Utolsó frissítés: 2026.05.21. — Szerző: Anti-Propaganda News Blog
Published in *The New York Times* on May 19, 2026 article reveals details of a previously unknown war plan that Israel and the United States developed during the military actions against Iran in February 2026. According to the report, the two countries aimed to overthrow Iran's theocratic leadership and transform the country's politics, with former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the country's new leader as a central element.
Summary of the article:
The basis of the plan:
The strategy was a multi-stage plan aimed at destabilizing the regime. Its first steps included eliminating the Iranian leadership (including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) through airstrikes at the beginning of the war, followed by a Kurdish ground mobilization to increase military pressure.
Ahmadinejad's role:
The idea was to position Ahmadinejad – a well-known figure in Iranian hardline politics who had previously called for the destruction of Israel – as an interim or new leader in the chaos. The plan was to free Ahmadinejad from house arrest in Tehran by a targeted Israeli airstrike.
The plan fails:
The operation went awry on the first day of the war. Although the airstrike destroyed the security post guarding Ahmadinejad's house, the former president himself was injured in the operation. Reports say that American and Israeli officials, as well as Ahmadinejad himself, subsequently became disillusioned with the plan.
Consequences:
Ahmadinejad has not appeared in public since, and his health and whereabouts are unknown. The article points to a strategic misunderstanding in which allies overestimated the internal discontent with the Iranian regime and underestimated the difficulties of implementing political change.
Analysis in terms of context:
The article highlights the strategic uncertainties surrounding the 2026 Iran war and the contradictions in diplomatic/military planning:
1. Risky choice:
The choice of a person in the person of Ahmadinejad, who had previously been criticized for his anti-Israel rhetoric and nuclear ambitions, clearly demonstrates the pragmatism (or, according to some analysts, the desperation) of American and Israeli planners, which placed short-term political goals ahead of long-term ideological consistency.
2. Intelligence and operational failures:
The failure of the plan indicates that the intervening powers misjudged Iran's domestic political conditions and Ahmadinejad's actual political influence and room for maneuver.
3. Diplomatic consequences:
The details that have been made public heighten the question marks surrounding the post-war settlement, as the article suggests that the aim of military operations (such as airstrikes) was not only to weaken the defense infrastructure, but also to directly destabilize the Iranian state system.
Overall, the article reveals that there was a lack of alignment between military and political goals in the planning of the Iran war, and that the „regime change” attempt collapsed early in the war.
The article mentions a Hungarian aspect that is particularly interesting in the context of the story:
According to a report by *The New York Times*, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Hungary in 2024 and 2025. The article cites these visits as evidence that the former Iranian president may have attempted to „reposition” himself on the international stage in recent years and sought contacts with countries that have close ties to Israel.
According to the reports, these trips to Budapest – especially the one in 2025 – fell on the period immediately before the outbreak of war. The paper thus suggests that Ahmadinejad’s foreign movements and contacts were not random as part of diplomatic or intelligence negotiations taking place in the background, and that perhaps negotiations were already underway at this time that could later form the basis of the (ultimately failed) takeover plan.
Overall, Hungary appears as a kind of "transit zone" or meeting point in the article about Ahmadinejad's political maneuvers.
