A German-Israeli-Hungarian defense industry triangle has been established in Hungary. Rheinmetall provides the manufacturing capacity and NATO compatibility,\u00a0Israel provides battle-proven, state-of-the-art technology,<\/b>\u00a0Hungary, for its part, provides the location, the investment, and the need for modernization.<\/p>\nThe Price of \u201eBattle-Proven\u201d: How Did Hungary Become Part of a Controversial Defense Industry Chain?<\/h2>\n
In recent years, Hungary has quietly but consistently built up a defense industry partnership that brings together the German company Rheinmetall, the Israeli defense industry, and the Hungarian government in a three-way alliance. Official communications portray this as modernization and an economic success. However, a much more uncomfortable issue lurks in the background:<\/p>\n
What does it actually mean to manufacture and export \u201ebattlefield-tested\u201d technology?<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
I. A New Industrial Model: Outsourced Responsibility?<\/h2>\n
At first glance, the model seems pragmatic:<\/p>\n
\n
- Rheinmetall ensures the European defense industry infrastructure and NATO compatibility.<\/li>\n
- Israeli companies\u2014such as Elbit Systems\u2014supply advanced sensors, drone technology, and fire control systems.<\/li>\n
- And Hungary,\u00a0manufacturing base, government support, and political stability<\/strong>\u00a0offers.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
However, this structure can also be interpreted in another way:<\/p>\n
????\u00a0the distribution of technological risk, political responsibility, and ethical consequences among three countries.<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nII. Hungary: Producer or Indirect Authorizer?<\/h2>\n
Hungary's role is crucial, yet it has been under-examined.<\/p>\n
The country:<\/p>\n
\n
- accepts the production,<\/li>\n
- funds the development,<\/li>\n
- and will become part of the export chain.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
This raises a difficult question:<\/p>\n
????\u00a0If the use of a technology is the subject of international debate, can its production be considered a politically neutral activity?<\/strong><\/p>\n
According to the official position, yes\u2014it's purely a matter of industrial policy.
\nAccording to the critical viewpoint, however:<\/p>\nManufacturing is not neutral; rather, it is participation in a global military ecosystem.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nIII. Germany\u2019s Role: Export Controls and Reality<\/h2>\n
In theory, Germany has one of the strictest arms export regulations in Europe. However:<\/p>\n
\n
- maintains a strategic partnership with Israel,<\/li>\n
- supports joint development projects,<\/li>\n
- and a key player in Hungarian manufacturing.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
This duality points to a structural problem:<\/p>\n
????\u00a0Issues that are politically sensitive in Germany can be more easily \u201eoutsourced\u201d to a third country.<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nIV. The Invisible Chain: Who Bears the Consequences?<\/h2>\n
One of the most important characteristics of a triangle is that:<\/p>\n
\n
- Development is taking place in several countries,<\/li>\n
- production takes place elsewhere,<\/li>\n
- and the application takes place in a completely different region.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
This structure makes it difficult to determine whether:<\/p>\n
Who is responsible for the end use of the technology?.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
And perhaps this is one of the main advantages of the system for participants.<\/p>\n
\nV. Moral Blind Spots and Political Silence<\/h2>\n
In Hungarian public discourse, developments in the defense industry are typically discussed from economic and security perspectives. Rarely is mention made of the fact that:<\/p>\n
\n
- In what kinds of conflicts have these systems proven their worth,<\/li>\n
- what human rights issues are associated with them,<\/li>\n
- and what long-term political consequences this cooperation might have.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
However, this silence does not mean that the questions do not exist.<\/p>\n
\nVI. The Real Question<\/h2>\n
German-Israeli-Hungarian defense industry cooperation is technologically logical, economically justifiable, and militarily understandable.<\/p>\n
But that's not the fundamental question.<\/p>\n
Can a technology be morally neutral if its value is derived in part from experiences gained during conflicts?<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
And if not:<\/p>\n
So where is the line between necessary protection and problematic participation?<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The \u201ebattle-proven\u201d dilemma \u2013 specifically<\/b><\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
One of the main selling points of the Israeli defense industry is that its systems are \u201ebattlefield-tested.\u201d However, this is not a neutral statement.<\/p>\n
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have examined the tactics used during Israeli military operations in several reports.<\/p>\n
Key points:<\/p>\n
\n
- Proportionality of attacks on civilian infrastructure<\/li>\n
- the use of firearms in densely populated areas<\/li>\n
- reliability of target identification<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? If \u201etesting\u201d takes place in these environments, then the value of the technology\u00a0is intertwined with these issues<\/strong>.<\/p>\n
\nV. International Law: Where Is the Line Drawn?<\/h2>\n
From a legal perspective, the issue is not black and white, but there are relevant frameworks:<\/p>\n
1. Arms Exports and Responsibility<\/h3>\n
The European Union's arms export regulations prohibit the following in principle:<\/p>\n
\n
- the export of weapons that\u00a0may lead to human rights abuses<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
2. International Humanitarian Law<\/h3>\n
Principles:<\/p>\n
\n
- proportionality<\/li>\n
- distinction (civilian vs. military target)<\/li>\n
- necessity<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
If the use of a system involves a violation of these principles, the question may arise:<\/p>\n
????\u00a0Is the manufacturer or supplier liable?<\/strong><\/p>\n
3. The Role of the International Criminal Court<\/h3>\n
The ICC may investigate:<\/p>\n
\n
- war crimes<\/li>\n
- attacks against the civilian population<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
Although manufacturers are rarely directly liable, there are an increasing number of legal disputes over whether:<\/p>\n
To what extent can those who provide the technology be held liable?.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nVI. Hungary\u2019s Position: Legally Sound, Morally Controversial.<\/h2>\n
Hungary, formally:<\/p>\n
\n
- NATO member<\/li>\n
- EU member<\/li>\n
- operates within a legally regulated framework<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
At the same time, according to critics:<\/p>\n
\n
- through manufacturing\u00a0becomes an indirect party to contentious conflicts<\/strong>,<\/li>\n
- due to technological integration\u00a0not entirely neutral<\/strong>,<\/li>\n
- and politically as well\u00a0builds a one-sided network of relationships<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nVII. The Key Issue<\/h2>\n
The Zalaegerszeg factory, the KF41 Lynx, the PzH 2000, and the Israeli systems together are creating a new reality:<\/p>\n
Hungary is not only a consumer of, but also a participant in, the technological chain of modern warfare.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
And with that, a new question arises:<\/p>\n
Can an industry whose products derive their value from conflicts be treated as a purely economic decision?<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Contracts, Cash Flows, and Corporate Networks<\/h2>\n
The Hungarian-German-Israeli defense industry cooperation is not a single project, but a\u00a0a multi-layered industrial and financial system<\/strong>, in which:<\/p>\n
\n
- government contracts<\/li>\n
- joint ventures<\/li>\n
- international supply chains<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
They build on one another.<\/p>\n
\nI. The Main Contract: The 2-billion-euro Lynx Agreement<\/h1>\n
The system is based on the 2020 contract:<\/p>\n
\n
- Hungary \u2194 Rheinmetall<\/li>\n
- value:\u00a0more than 2 billion euros<\/strong><\/li>\n
- Contents:\n
\n
- 218 KF41 Lynx units<\/li>\n
- logistics, simulators, maintenance<\/li>\n
- full life-cycle support<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? This isn't just a simple purchase, but\u00a0industrial development agreement<\/strong>.<\/p>\n
\nII. The Production Model: Joint Venture + Technology Transfer<\/h1>\n
One of the key elements of the contract is:<\/p>\n
\n
- the\u00a0Rheinmetall Hungary Zrt.<\/strong><\/li>\n
- ownership percentage:\n
\n
- Rheinmetall:\u00a051%<\/strong><\/li>\n
- Hungarian State:\u00a049%<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? This is a classic \u201ejoint venture,\u201d but one with strategic significance:<\/p>\n
\n
- The German side controls the technology<\/li>\n
- The Hungarian party will finance and localize it<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
What does this mean in practice?<\/h3>\n
\n
- First series: Made in Germany<\/li>\n
- later series: in Hungary<\/li>\n
- gradual transfer of knowledge<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? This\u00a0semi-peripheral industrialization model<\/strong>:
\nNot full technological sovereignty, but integration.<\/p>\n
\nIII. The Zalaegerszeg Complex: More Than Just a Factory<\/h1>\n
The investment:<\/p>\n
\n
- an industrial and testing center covering several dozen hectares<\/li>\n
- test track (ZALA Zone)<\/li>\n
- development capacity<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? Not just manufacturing, but also:<\/p>\n
development + testing + export platform<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This is particularly important because:<\/p>\n
\n
- can also produce for export markets<\/li>\n
- is not intended solely for use in Hungary<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nIV. Supplementary Agreements and Systems<\/h1>\n
Lynx is just the \u201ecore.\u201d Several contracts are built around the system:<\/p>\n
1. Air Defense Development<\/h3>\n
\n
- Skyranger 30<\/li>\n
- Development contract: ~30 million \u20ac<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
2. Missile and Sensor Systems<\/h3>\n
\n
- NASAMS (approximately 410 million \u20ac)<\/li>\n
- radars, integrated network<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? All of these together:<\/p>\n
They form a complex combat system, not separate tools<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nV. Connections to Israel (critical, but less transparent)<\/h1>\n
Public contracts rarely go into detail, but:<\/p>\n
\n
- Drone program: Israeli cooperation (e.g., UVision)<\/li>\n
- Spike missiles, sensors (well-known Israeli export products)<\/li>\n
- electro-optical and targeting systems<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? This is a\u00a0\u201esoft integration\u201d model<\/strong>:<\/p>\n
\n
- There isn't always a direct treaty between states<\/li>\n
- but Israeli technology is integrated into the systems<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nVI. The Corporate Network: State \u2192 Holding Company \u2192 Joint Venture<\/h1>\n
The structure operates on multiple levels:<\/p>\n
1. Hungarian national level<\/h3>\n
\n
- Ministry of National Defense<\/li>\n
- state-owned defense industry holding company (e.g., N7 system)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
2. Privatization Policy<\/h3>\n
\n
- N7 Defense \u2192 partial outsourcing<\/li>\n
- Relationship with the 4iG Group<\/li>\n
- value:\u00a0~82.8 billion Ft<\/b><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? This is a critical point:<\/p>\n
state-owned defense industry \u2192 semi-private, politically controlled structure<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nVII. Financial Logic: Who Stands to Gain from This?<\/h1>\n
The system has three levels:<\/p>\n
1. Rheinmetall<\/h3>\n
\n
- Grand Prize Winner:\n
\n
- technology<\/li>\n
- export<\/li>\n
- license<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
2. The Hungarian State<\/h3>\n
\n
- profit:\n
\n
- workplace<\/li>\n
- industrial development<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n
- risk:\n
\n
- funding<\/li>\n
- political responsibility<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
3. Suppliers (Israeli and others)<\/h3>\n
\n
- high added value<\/li>\n
- low visibility<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
???? This is an asymmetric value chain.<\/strong><\/p>\n
The Hungarian Defense Industry\u00a0no<\/b>\u00a0\u201enational project\u201d in the traditional sense.<\/p>\n
It's more like:<\/p>\n
integration into a global defense industry network<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
where:<\/p>\n
\n
- Germany \u2192 industrial and political power<\/li>\n
- Israel \u2192 technological and battlefield expertise<\/b><\/li>\n
- \n
Hungary \u2192 Manufacturing and Financial Platform<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
The numbers speak for themselves:<\/p>\n
\n
- Main contract worth over 2 billion \u20ac<\/strong><\/li>\n
- additional systems costing hundreds of millions<\/li>\n
- mixed ownership<\/li>\n
- partial privatization<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
Financial asymmetry:<\/b>\u00a0License Fees and Value Added<\/p>\n
A significant portion of the 2 billion euro total will not remain in Zalaegerszeg in the form of wages, but rather:<\/p>\n
\n
- In the form of license fees<\/b>\u00a0flows back to Rheinmetall (D\u00fcsseldorf).<\/li>\n
- Software Licenses and Specialized Sensors<\/b>\u00a0As a result, he emigrates to Israel.<\/li>\n
- In Hungary, the\u00a0maintenance costs for manufacturing infrastructure<\/b>\u00a0and only the lower-value-added supply will remain.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
But the number isn't the point.<\/p>\n
But this:<\/p>\n
Hungary has joined a defense industry system in which responsibility is shared\u2014but the consequences are not necessarily shared.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1. The 4iG Factor: The \u201eDigital\u201d Israeli Connection<\/strong><\/h3>\n
The relationship between 4iG Nyrt. and Rheinmetall isn't just on paper. There is a key element that reinforces the Israeli connection:\u00a0Spacecom<\/b>.<\/p>\n
\n
- 4iG has acquired a majority stake in the Israeli\u00a0Spacecom<\/b>\u00a0satellite service provider.<\/li>\n
- The logic:<\/b>\u00a0Modern warfare (and the Lynx systems) would be inconceivable without a secure, satellite-based data link. This is where Hungarian private capital, German combat vehicles, and Israeli space technology come together. This represents the highest level of \u201esoft integration.\u201d.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
2. Tier 2\u20133 Suppliers: The Deep Layer of Software<\/h3>\n
Although Lynx is German, its \u201eeyes\u201d and \u201ebrain\u201d are often Israeli.<\/b><\/p>\n
\n
- Elbit Systems:<\/b>\u00a0Rheinmetall also works closely with Elbit on a global scale. Elbit\u2019s helmet-mounted displays, night vision, and communications systems form the foundation of \u201edigital soldier\u201d programs (such as those being developed in Hungary).<\/li>\n
- Rafael & EuroSpike:<\/b>\u00a0This joint venture (Rheinmetall, Diehl, Rafael) is responsible for the Lynx\u2019s anti-tank capabilities. During production in Zalaegerszeg, not only is the missile installed in the turret, but also the fire control software, whose algorithms have been fine-tuned based on Israeli battlefield data.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
3. The \u201eexport platform\u201d and end-user responsibility<\/h3>\n
The legal \u201egray area,\u201d the\u00a0upon re-export<\/b>\u00a0becomes a critic.<\/p>\n
\n
- If a combat vehicle assembled in Hungary, under a German license and equipped with Israeli missiles, is sold to a third country (for example, a non-NATO partner), it triggers a maze of arms export licenses (Export Control).<\/li>\n
- Who can say no?<\/b>\u00a0Berlin, Jerusalem, and Budapest may all have veto power over certain components. This places Hungary in a sort of \u201ediplomatic bargaining position\u201d: we are the location where these interests take physical form.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
The \u201esecurity provider\u201d state model<\/h3>\n
With this strategy, Hungary is not a \u201emajor arms-producing power\u201d in the traditional sense, but rather a\u00a0an indispensable logistics and technology hub<\/b>. If anyone on NATO\u2019s eastern flank needs a Lynx or a Vaskupola radar, there\u2019s a good chance their path (for service, parts, or training) will lead through Hungary.<\/p>\n
Legal\/Ethical Risk:<\/b>\u00a0Responsibility is diffused. If a projectile fired from a German cannon and guided by an Israeli algorithm strikes civilians in a future conflict, lawyers could spend years debating whether the manufacturer (Germany), the software developer (Israel), or the assembler\/exporter (Hungary) is responsible for the tragedy.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
While inward technology transfer (Israel \u2192 Hungary) is impressive, the flow in the opposite direction (Hungary \u2192 Israel) is a \u201epolitical and legal minefield.\u201d.<\/strong><\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
1. \u201eCircular\u201d Export (Return of Components)<\/strong><\/h3>\n
This is the most likely and least spectacular option. Since Rheinmetall Hungary operates as a joint venture, its production chain is global.<\/p>\n
\n
- Component Manufacturing:<\/b>\u00a0It is not necessarily combat vehicles (Lynx) that are being sent to Israel, but rather components manufactured at Rheinmetall\u2019s plants in Hungary (e.g., Zalaegerszeg or, in the future, V\u00e1rpalota).<\/li>\n
- Integration tests:<\/b>\u00a0Israeli weapons systems (e.g., Spike missile integration) may be tested in Hungary, and the technology or software infrastructure fine-tuned here will then be returned to the Israeli parent companies (Rafael, Elbit).<\/li>\n
- Ammunition:<\/b>\u00a0V\u00e1rpalota could play a key role. Israel has a constant and enormous need for artillery and tank ammunition. If Rheinmetall\u2019s factory there produces ammunition that meets NATO standards but is also compatible with Israeli systems, it could serve as a strategic supply line.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
2. The Gidr\u00e1n Thread and the Turkish-Israeli-Hungarian Triangle<\/h3>\n
A\u00a0Gidran<\/b>\u00a0The case of (Nurol Makina Ejder Yal\u00e7\u0131n) is unique. It is a Turkish vehicle that is being fitted with extras in Hungary (in Kaponv\u00e1r).<\/p>\n
\n
- Israeli content:<\/b>\u00a0Some of the Gidran's electronic and communications equipment is of Israeli origin.<\/li>\n
- The issue of re-export:<\/b>\u00a0The question arises as to whether these vehicles\u2014which have been \u201eHungarianized\u201d in Hungary but are essentially Turkish-Israeli hybrids\u2014might be deployed in third countries or even in Israel for special missions. (It is important to note that while political relations between Turkey and Israel are volatile, technological cooperation often continues behind the scenes.).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
3. Legal and Ethical \u201eCheck and Balances\u201d (Export Control)<\/h3>\n
Direct arms exports from Hungary to Israel are strictly regulated by law:<\/p>\n
\n
- End-User Certificate:<\/b>\u00a0This is the basis for all arms exports. Hungary must guarantee that the equipment will not fall into hands or be used in a manner that violates international law.<\/li>\n
- German veto:<\/b>\u00a0Since most of the technology manufactured here is based on a German (Rheinmetall) license, Berlin has a say in where we can sell the finished product. If Germany restricts arms shipments to Israel (which is occasionally the subject of political debate in Berlin), this also affects the production lines in Hungary.<\/li>\n
- Israeli \u201ebuyback\u201d:<\/b>\u00a0A common scenario is for a country to sell technology and then \u201ebuy back\u201d or lease the product manufactured abroad (in this case, in Hungary) if its own production capacity is limited.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
4. Why is this export \u201einvisible\u201d?<\/h3>\n
\n
- Dual-use:<\/b>\u00a0Many devices (sensors, software, telecommunications equipment) are not directly classified as weapons, so customs regulations and official statistics treat them differently than a cannon or a tank.<\/li>\n
- Intermediaries:<\/b>\u00a0The goods do not travel along the \u201eBudapest \u2192 Tel Aviv\u201d route, but often pass through German or American parent companies, so they appear in the statistics as \u201eexports of parts to Germany.\u201d. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
A<\/strong>\u00a0Rheinmetall\u00a0<\/strong>AG.<\/strong>\u00a0The most important pillars of Israel's direct exports and cooperation:<\/strong><\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
1. The \u201eArmored Axis\u201d: 120 mm Technology<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Although Israel manufactures its own tanks (the Merkava series), Rheinmetall's world-renowned tank gun technology is indispensable.<\/p>\n
\n
- Ammunition Exports:<\/b>\u00a0Rheinmetall is one of the main suppliers of NATO-standard\u00a0For 120-mm tank shells<\/b>. Since the Merkava III and IV cannons are NATO-compatible, Rheinmetall\u2019s precision ammunition (such as the DM series of armor-piercing rounds) is exported directly to the IDF (Israel Defense Forces).<\/li>\n
- Components:<\/b>\u00a0The manufacturing technology for certain specialized alloys and cannon barrel components\u2014or the components themselves\u2014are supplied to Israel\u2019s heavy industry from German factories.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
2. EuroSpike: The \u201eHoly Trinity\u201d<\/h3>\n
This is one of Rheinmetall's most important strategic businesses. The\u00a0EuroSpike GmbH<\/b>\u00a0a joint venture with the German\u00a0Rheinmetall<\/b>, the\u00a0Diehl Defence<\/b>\u00a0and the Israeli\u00a0Rafael<\/b>\u00a0between.<\/p>\n
\n
- How does it work?<\/b>\u00a0Rafael developed the Spike missile, while Rheinmetall is responsible for its \u201eEuropeanization,\u201d production, and integration.<\/li>\n
- Destination of direct exports:<\/b>\u00a0Although the missile is essentially Israeli, Rheinmetall has\u00a0boot systems, optical drives, and electronic interfaces<\/b>\u00a0exports to Israel the components necessary for these weapons to meet the requirements of modern, digital warfare.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
3. Naval Systems<\/h3>\n
The relationship between Rheinmetall and the Israeli Navy is less high-profile, but all the more critical.<\/p>\n
\n
- Sensors and Electronics:<\/b>\u00a0The Israeli\u00a0Dolphin-class<\/b>\u00a0The internal systems, fire control, and surveillance units of submarines (built by the German company TKMS) incorporate significant Rheinmetall technology (such as periscope systems and optical sensors).<\/li>\n
- Natter and Artillery:<\/b>\u00a0Rheinmetall's remotely operated weapon stations (RWS) and shipboard defense systems (such as the MASS jamming system) are also deployed directly on Israeli warships.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\n4. Types of Direct Exports (Summary Table)<\/h3>\n
\n\n
\n Area<\/strong><\/td>\n Specific product\/technology<\/strong><\/td>\n Role<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n \n Ammunition<\/b><\/td>\n 120-mm and 155-mm shells<\/td>\n Direct battlefield resupply<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Armor<\/b><\/td>\n Specialty steel and ceramic components<\/td>\n Integrated into the defense systems of Israeli vehicles<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Electronics<\/b><\/td>\n Fire control computers, optics<\/td>\n Improving the Effectiveness of Targeting and Monitoring<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Defense Systems<\/b><\/td>\n Active and Passive Jamming Devices<\/td>\n Protecting Ships and Tanks Against Missiles<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
\n5. Why isn't this export \u201espectacular\u201d?<\/h3>\n
Rheinmetall's exports to Israel are often referred to as the \u201e\u201dtechnology supplier\"<\/b>\u00a0will remain in that role.<\/p>\n
\n
- Re-export:<\/b>\u00a0In many cases, Rheinmetall does not sell finished weapons, but rather components that are installed in Israel into Merkava tanks or Namer armored personnel carriers. Thus, the end product is \u201eMade in Israel,\u201d but its \u201eheart\u201d is German.<\/li>\n